A bstract
IN TRO D U C TIO N
T he teachings of such as Kenneth Hagin, characterized by the term prosperity cult are very much a product o f their times. I have elsewhere (Williams, 1985) described the features of the m odern world that provided fertile ground for what I believe to be a heresy so attractive to the milieu o f modern man, at least in the West. O ur society is so acquisitive in its general ethos that theology cannot rem ain unaffected by it. (For a good description o f this, and how it has affected theology, see F rank, 1986 .) The justification of th e increasing prosperity o f men, and particularly the teaching th at a Christian has a god-given right and a god-given m eans to such ever increasing wealth could only have arisen in such a society as ours. (F o r fuller explan atio n s o f the prosperity cult, see Williams, 1985 or Sarles, 1986 .) It could never have taken root either in a different time, nor could it take root in a society which does not know such wealth as ours.
Many attem pts have been m ade to refute this teaching. These may be either from a Biblical perspective, pointing out the deficiencies of its fundam entalist approach to the Scriptures, which takes all texts as applicable to later readers without reference to the original situation o r to the rest o f the Bible, both o f which may well modify their understanding (cf Williams, 1985:21, of Mark, 11:24) . O ther criticisms are made from experience, pointing out the dangers that result from an acceptance of its practices. I want here to consider the prosperity teaching from a different perspective, seeking to show the deficiencies in the assumptions of the approach. H ere help comes from an unexpected source, the traditional ontological argument for the existence of God.
This argum ent is deeply embedded in the philosophical world view that dom inated the M iddle Ages. Today it is hardly m ore than a curiosity due to the collapse of its p resuppositions, although it still stim ulates a considerable am ount of intellectual activity particularly among logicians (cf Barnes, 1972 , Plantinga, 1968 , because it is unique among the classical arguments for God in that it alone is an argum ent a priori, simply from the nature of G od and not from the world. N evertheless with the em er gence of the m odern world in the Enlightenm ent and particularly with the devastating attack on the ontological argum ent by the apostle of the Enlightenm ent, Kant, it has ceased to have any real value. The modern world is different from that of the Middle Ages, and in it the ontological argument does not find a place.
It is clear that it is impossible to discover any intellectual link betw een the ontological argum ent and prosperity teaching. They belong to different eras and different world views. Historically the ontological argum ent precedes any hint of prosperity teaching, but there is no developing line of thought from the argum ent. On the other hand, the arguments of prosperity teaching can be traced back to different sources. I see it as an amalgam of two streams (Williams, 1987) . On the one hand there is 'positive thought' em bodied most clearly in the teaching of N orm an V incent Peale, which has its own antecedents in the Victorious Life movement and perhaps Christian Science, but is a direct result of the American ethos. It really only emerged with the modern world and as a result of that world, particularly in America. On the other hand a far more ancient root, the giving of G od's power to men, goes back to the time of the apostles and even beyond them to the prophets and judges of the Old Testam ent. Nevertheless it is only again with the m odern world that Pentecostalism, and more recently the Charismatic movement, have broken in on the world. N either of these has any contact whatsoever with medieval philosophy; in fact, among these movements there is rather a despising o f any form o f in te llec tu a lism . In te re stin g ly S a rle s (1986:350) sees th e an tiintellectualism of much evangelicalism as a root of the prosperity cult.
H owever, although th ere is no connection w hatsoever betw een the two, th ere is a sim ilarity o f logic th at com es to light. T hus the w ell-understood argum ents which pertain to the ontological argum ent are also applicable to the m odern innovation of prosperity teaching, and will clarify its assumptions and failings.
D EFININ G T H E CONCEPTS

Conception
It is well known that the ontological argum ent was formulated in two main ways. The most famous is associated with the name of Anselm of Canterbury. H e started with the premise, obviously true to him, and to anyone of that era, that G od must be perfect. In other words he had a conception of what G od is like. From this he argued that what exists must be m ore perfect than what does not exist, and therefore, from the very conception of G od, He m ust necessarily exist. The form ulation of D escartes was slightly different. Again starting from the conception of G od as perfect, he argued rather that a perfect being must have everything, and existence is then one thing that can be possessed. Again, God must necessarily exist. The attack of Kant here is more devastating to D escartes' form of the argum ent, but is also applicable to Anselm. Existence, he said, is not a predicate. A being is not more perfect by existing or by not existing. W hat is however of importance here is to nóte that from the very conception of G od, the argum ent is that He exists. Crudely, G od is willed into existence by our conception of Him, although Anselm is careful to note that G od is greater than could be conceived of. The conception of God is really what is conceived of.
As far as we are concerned, conception is prior to existence. Something will not exist for us, that is, its existence is irrelevant for us, unless we have some idea of what it is. We modify our behaviour not because of the existence of things, but because of our conception of them . O f course, events do happen to us of which we are previously unaware, but unless they kill us, our subsequent behaviour is affected by our concept ion of them. Likewise when it comes to possession, we do not desire to have an object w ithout a prior conception of w hat th at object is. This point is of course m ade by Anselm himself in his assertion that before creation or manufacture, an object exists in the mind of its maker.
Crucial to the ontological argum ent is the conception that G od is om nipotent, total, having everything as a function of his perfection. Prosperity teaching shares this view of G od. He is able to provide all that his supplicants ask, and so, it is believed, if the request is made in the right way, G od will answer it. In the latter case, the dominant idea is th a t o f the kingship and authority o f G od. T h erefo re because we are his children, G od is both able and willing to respond to our requests. Prayer made in the right way is necessarily answered.
C onception is th erefo re a vital m atter in prosperity teaching, but in this case goes further. The traditional approach to sickness and poverty, apart from attacking them in a 'practical' way, is to pray about them, bringing the needs to God. Not so, argues the new approach. T hat 'negative confession' centres the mind upon the problem and in itself is then a cause of the problem . R ather, em phasis must be placed upon the solution to the problems. Thus the major technique o f prosperity teaching is what is known as 'positive confession' w here visualization o f th e desired solution, not the problem , is used to bring about the result. For example, a leading prosperity teacher writes, 'T h e Word will work for you when it becomes a reality in your heart" (original em phasis) (Copeland, 1978:59) , and Hagin (1972:14) himself advises, "see yourself as having received". In this it is sim ilar to the visualization concept o f such as Peale (1953:61) , or in modern sales psychology. (O ther techniques are inter alia the ideas of seed faith (M ark 10:30) by which it is believed th a t G o d will repay any gift one h undred fold, and "agreeing" (M att 18:19) .) Now it is indubitable th a t a positive attitude does produce results, particularly in the latter case, but it is also indubitable th a t the sim ple application o f positive confession has caused great problem s. T he obvious case is in sickness, w here the application of positive confession, the visualiz ation of p erfect h ealth has the c o u n terp art o f necessarily claiming healing, and so d isco n tin u in g any o th e r form o f tre a tm e n t, o fte n w ith trag ic resu lts. Positive confession has as its corollary the idea th at any doubt, th at is, negative confession, is also effective in stopping the desired result. T he usual text cited here is Jam es 1:6-8: "But let him ask in faith, with no doubting ... a double-minded man ... will [not] receive anything from the Lord." This means that any failure to receive either healing or the material prosperity prayed for is attributed to doubt. Again w hat is critical is that the conception of the desired result actually causes it to come into existence, o r so it is believed.
The ontological argum ent is often phrased g reater than can be conceived' rather than greatest possible', and the contrast made betw een existence in the mind and reality. In fact the idea of conception may be thought to be entirely superfluous, until it is rem em bered th at A nselm 's purpose was to convince the 'fool' who, to his mind likewise had a conception of God but did not realize its implications, and so denied the existence of God. W hat Anselm was arguing for was not so much a concept of God, but th at the 'fool' would receive G od to H im self as Lord. Likewise the prosperity teachers are arguing not for the exercise of the im agination in conceiving of the things th at may be desired, but for the im plication of such visualization. T he things, it is believed, may be received if visualized correctly. In both cases th erefo re, correct visualization leads to personal possession; a closer relationship, on the one hand, to God, and on the other, to the thing desired.
2
Infinite merit A further point of contact between the ontological argum ent and prosperity teaching, albeit a secondary one, derives from the idea of G od as infinite, which is an aspect of G od's nature implicit in the conception of the ontological argument.
With such an understanding of the perfection of God, it is not surprising that Anselm saw the atonem ent as related to it. With a view of G od as infinite, it was a small step to the notion of infinite merit available for us in the death of Christ, such that our sins are outweighed by the transfer of this merit.
Prosperity teachers stand in the line of American fundam entalism which can trace its roots back to the R eform ation and the penal substitution theory o f the atonem ent. This sees the death of Christ as the infinite penalty for the sins of believers, such that Christ dies as a substitute. They extend this idea from substitution for the penalty of sin to include the results of sin in sickness and poverty. T hus because Jesus died, health and prosperity may be claim ed, but with the further assertion o f im m ediate rather than eschatological receipt. '
A gain th e re is no h isto rical con n ectio n betw een th e two sets o f ideas, b u t it is interesting that both relate so strongly to the same basic idea.
3 T he objections
O bjection to A nselm was not slow in forthcoming. It seem s im possible th at simply from a conception of th e p erfect can com e such a neat argum ent for the age-old problem of the existence of God. A nother ecclesiastic, as is well known, attem pted to show a flaw in the argum ent by outlining a similar statem ent. H e argued that the same logic would hold in the case of an island. If such a perfect island could be conceived of, then it m ust necessarily exist. The answ er is th at the argum ent is only valid if it is ap p lied to w hat is th e m ost p e rfe c t o f all, and islands a re su rp assab le in th e ir perfection. This m eans that the argum ent is only valid in reference to G od, not for anything else. Such logic m ust th en be tak en n o te of by th e prosperity teachers. Simply to have a conception o f something does not m ean that it exists, no m atter how perfect it is, unless that thing is the most perfect of all, God.
In this regard H agin and o th er advocates o f prosperity teaching must be seen as an advance on the simple positive thinkers. I would exclude Peale here because he does base his optimism on more than psychology but rather upon the Fatherhood of God. It is how ever h ard to see th a t th e p o sitio n o f Schuller, a disciple of P eale, differs significantly from psychology (cf Schuller, 1982) . It can be argued that visualization of the desired end and positive thinking is effective, but on a psychological level. It g e n e ra te s a m ind set which is m ore likely to achieve success than a m ind full of pessimism and defeat. It cannot, however, be argued that this will always work because circumstances may be such as to negate the value of positive thought.
Hagin, and like-minded teachers, however stress that their concept of visualization and positive confession are more than simply positive thinking, but are effective because G od is the source of the benefits prayed for. It is only because they are going to the ultim ate that they can claim such confidence in prayer.
Such confidence is based on the one hand on their conception of the nature of G od as almighty and loving. They see themselves in covenant relationship with the ultimate, so that any request can be answered. Any problem is not on the side of G od but of men. On the other hand, and this is the source of their idea o f G od, their source of authority is based on a fundamentalist approach to the Bible. They therefore trust the Bible as completely the Word of God, totally trustworthy and applicable to any situat ion. Therefore they apply texts such as Philippians 4:19, and especially Mark 11:24 (this is quoted on all Hagin's booklets), treating them as im mediate promises of God.
Both the ontological argum ent of Anselm and the prosperity teaching of Hagin there fore claim validity on the same grounds. The argument, perhaps cleverer in the former case, is only valid because it deals with the infinite G od and not with any lesser forces.
T H E VALIDITY O F T H E A RG UM EN TS
Both arguments consist essentially of two parts, a prem ise or assumption and a logical deduction from that assumption. In the case of the ontological argum ent the premise is the perfection of G od, the deduction is His necessary existence. In the case of prosperity teaching, the prem ise is a view of G od's om nipotence and acts based on a fu ndam entalist approach to the Bible, the d eduction is th e n a claim of receipt of m aterial benefits. I w ant here to consider briefly the second part, the deduction, before moving to what I believe is the heart of the m atter, the assumption concerning God.
The objection of Kant is essentially that there is no significant difference between our conception of things that exist and things which do not exist, and so existence adds nothing to a concept. T herefore a thing which exists is not greater, or more perfect, than a thing which does not exist. I believe that here we are again dealing with the reply to the objection of G aunilo. A nselm was careful to say th at it was not his conception of G od which must exist, b u t th a t G od was a being such th a t nothing g re a te r than Him can be conceived at all. Now A nselm is conscious o f the gulf betw een him self and G od, which is the basis of his en tire argum ent; th erefo re, if
anyone can have such a conception of God, it is God himself, and this thought leads to necessary existence, albeit by circularity.
It is sim ilar G od-centredness which is relevant to the prosperity teaching. Hagin and others essentially put the initiative with man who is responsible for the faith in God, and the conception of the desired object. This must be invalid because it is based on m a n 's idea, just as A n selm 's idea of G od does not have necessary existence. The validity is based upon the conception being that of God.
It hardly needs to be said that G od's existence is in no way contingent upon som eone's having a co n cep tio n o f him . T he ontological arg u m en t concerns a p ro o f of his existence, not a cause of it, but nevertheless God can be said to have a conception of H imself which alone would correspond to reality in a way that ours never could. I am here rem inded of the old idealism where everything was reduced to mind, and the two lim ericks by R on ald Knox which so readily describe it, which however relate the conception to the mind of God:
T here was a young man who said, "God Must find it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be W hen there's no one about in the quad."
"Dear Sir, your astonishment's odd I am always about in the quad And that is why the tree Will continue to be Since observed by, yours faithfully, God." N e ith er of course does th e p rosperity cult believe th a t visualization or 'positive confession' brings the desired object into existence, but it does cause its transference to the asker. Its receipt is dependent upon the request. Thus a m ajor criticism of the prosperity cult must be its anthropocentricity. It sees on the one hand man's initiative in deciding w hat he wants, with G o d 's role th at o f response and o f granting these requests. On the other hand, it teaches that this response is contingent upon the faith of man. O ne explanation therefore of the delay in receiving what is prayed for is that for large req u ests it tak es a w hile to build up the necessary faith (cf eg. Sarles, 1986:343) . This is surely a travesty of the theocentricity o f Christianity which sees m an's o th er role rath er as a response to the will of G od, and that all, even faith, is given by Him. It is a significant comment that a technique, which claims to work by its emphasis on the almightiness of God, at the same time effectively makes G od subject to the whims of man.
Prosperity teaching will read its key verse, Mark 11:24, "W hatsoeveryou desire, believe th a t you receive it and you will" (em phasis m ine), w hereas as I have elsew here com m ented, o th er indications in the Bible are th at prayer is effective only if it is conformity to the pre-existing will of G od. It is rather G od who takes the initiative, and then if prayer is made in conformity to that will (as expressed in 1 John 5:14), then it will be granted. H ere lies a more correct emphasis, for if the receipt of an object is desired by God, so His concept; then our request is valid, and indeed will work.
T H E VALIDITY O F T H E PREM ISES
From their premises, both the arguments of the prosperity teachers and the ontological argum ent may claim som e validity. (T he ontological argum ent is seen as a valid deduction from its prem ise by such as H artshorne and Malcolm (Plantinga, 1968:123, 136) , or by Barnes, 1972:80 .) The major attack on the ontological argum ent has how ever centred on its premise, that of the perfection of God. This is an assumption that prosperity teaching also makes, and which is likewise questionable.
Perfection
Now it may well be valid to argue about the moral perfection of God, such that what is right may be defined as conformity to his will, although even this is disputed ground today. The question here is rath er w hether G od may be seen as p erfect in every possible way (or else the objection o f G aunilo becom es valid), and indeed w hether perfection is a valid concept at all.
It is not true to argue at this point that as we have a conception of perfection, then th ere m ust be som ething co rresponding to th at conception (just as the feeling of hunger presupposes the existence of food). Such thinking may have seem ed valid to the ancient G reeks, and indeed is the root of the ontological argum ent, but must be discounted today.
R ath er the m odern view denies the existence of absolutes in any sphere whatsoever, but stresses the key concepts of developm ent or change, and relation. It can only be argued that one thing is better than another, not that there is an absolute good. W hat is denied is an infinite entity, qualitatively different conception from the things that exist, because there is no evidence whatsoever for this, as there is no evidence for the existence o f Platonic ideals or universals. A 'greatest possible' is then by definition im possible b ecau se som e q u a litie s such as len g th o r n u m b e r can be ad d ed to indefinitely.
In theology this is expressed in process theology w here G od is seen, like everything else, to be relative and developing. He is only the best at any particular time, but later he w ould b e seen as im proved. G od is not tran sc en d e n t, in th e sense o f being qualitatively different from the world, but is affected by and affects the world, a theory known as panentheism.
I do not believe that such a conception of God, if indeed true, necessarily invalidates the ontological argument, because the conception of God envisaged in it is a theoretic al and not an actual one, except insofar as it exists in the mind of G od. In this case G od is always 'perfect', because his conception of what is perfect at any one time will be the most perfect there is, and He will fulfil that conception immediately. (Unless it is postulated that G od can only work towards, as a process, conform ing H im self to what H e perceives H e ought to be, which in itself is an imperfection which itself must be elim inated. B ut in th at case there is a conception of w hat is perfect which itself would exist, giving two gods, which is absurd. Hence G od must correspond to His own conception of perfection at any time.) However, infinity is a valid concept, and as such is used in mathematics with different properties than the simply very large. Thus to say th a t G od is the g reatest conceivable is to say m ore th a n th a t H e is the g reatest possible. It is to add a qualitative difference. Such a difference is also present in prosperity thought, although the im plications of their view have not, I believe, been appreciated. A doctrine of the receipt of what is desired is possible, other things being equal; provided, on the one hand, that the desire is not too large, or that too many people are not desiring. If the world is finite, it is patently absurd to say that all prayers will necessarily be answered. Prosperity doctrine, if pressed to its logical conclusion, demands a limitless supply of what could be acquired, not just a very great one.
The relevance o f time
If G od is seen as developing in reaction to the world, the concept of tim e becomes vital, for G od would be the most perfect only at the end of the world. However, even if God is not changing in Himself, the world clearly is in a process of development, and moreover, unless G od is totally ignoring the world, its final state will be one which God d esires. In e ith e r case, an eschatological consum m ation o r final sta te becom es important in relation to the idea of G od's perfection.
This also m eans th at G od must be seen as currently limited, w hether inherently as in process theology, or, preferably to the writer, by choice. (The concept of ^//-lim itation does not fall into the trap of Kenoticism where Christ is limited from w ithout.) God does not wish to bring in the final state immediately. It can also be seen as necessary for the sake of the genuine free-will in men.
A realization of a changing world leads therefore to two significant concepts, those of the current (self-)lim itation of God, and that of eschatological, ra th e r than present, p erfectio n . B oth of these a re foreign to b o th th e o n to lo g ical a rg u m en t and to prosperity teaching. The ontological argum ent belongs to a world view which effective ly ignores eschatology, w here the em phasis falls upon stability, and thus w here p e rfe c tio n is a p ossible concept. L ikew ise, I b eliev e th a t a loss of a sense of eschatology has been one of the causes o f the prosperity doctrine. The loss of the sense of future has led to a concentration on the presen t, and as a result, biblical prom ises such as 2 C orinthians 9:6 are tre a te d as having a necessarily im m ediate fulfilment. In the same way, the hint o f any lim itation in G od, as it is foreign to the m edieval w orld view of the o n tological arg u m en t, is also ig n o red by p rosperity teaching.
T heir argum ent is of a G od totally loving, totally king, totally able to answer prayers. However, as the age-old dilemma of evil makes clear, this simply does not correspond with reality. E ither G od is not all loving, or he is not all-powerful. T here is no other explanation for the facts. The solution to this must be seen in the second half o f the dilem m a. A lthough G od is all-loving, he has chosen to lim it him self. T h ere is a distinction to be drawn between the ability of G od and what he chooses to do. Because of his love, and for the sake of our real free will, he has lim ited him self (and self lim itation to the ultim ate on the cross), but has nevertheless acted to redeem us from the effect of the sins which followed from human free-will so that the ultim ate good is greater than if G od had not limited Himself. As Augustine inferred, it is b etter to have sinned and to have been red eem ed than never to have sinned at all. Such a self limitation m eans that God, at the present, does not answer all requests made to him. The assum ption that G od as a loving F ath er (P eale's em phasis) or om nipotent king (prosperity teaching) m ust give us all th at we want, must be qualified. Even if we assume that the premise is true, it does not follow that we will receive whatever we ask for. A m om ent's reflection shows us that no father will give his children everything that they ask for; it is simply not the best for them. His love and care simply forbids agreeing with every request. A wise king also will not g ran t all the desires of his subjects. W ith his grasp of th e w orkings of state he freq u en tly a p p rec ia te s th at granting requests may som etimes seem very attractive, but ultim ately is detrim ental. Again validity of the assumption does not lead to validity of the argum ent unless it is in full relation to God.
Nevertheless, if the point of such self-lim itation is because of love, for the sake of the ultim ate good, it means that in the end, prayers for prosperity or healing are effectively answered, and the ultim ate benefit of current suffering or other deprivation is seen to be outweighed by the final benefits. For example, healing is seen to be total in the re creation of the saved in a spiritual body (1 Cor. 15). Non-receipt of what is asked for in prayer is therefore not due to defective faith, but because we live in an eschatological world.
2 Comparability
A more cogent objection to the ontological argum ent is not in its idea of perfection as an absolute, for it is evident that perfection may exist. For example, a perfect square is quite possible, and perfect examples of other things not only are possible, but actually exist. R ather the assumption implicit in the ontological argum ent is that all things are comparable, so that it is always possible to say one thing is better than another, so that G od is clearly best of all, or greater than all. Such an assumption is however clearly not the case as would be obvious if Anselm's conception was actual and not theoretical. It is not possible, for example, to compare a bear with a beetle, o r a clock with a car. T hey are simply different. A nselm 's m istake h ere is o f a concept o f g reatness or perfection w ithout relating it to any specific thing. E verything is lum ped together w ithout regard to individuality. (It is tem pting to p o in t o u t h e re th a t A nselm is following the path of the first sin of A dam and Eve, who w ere tem pted to com pare themselves to God, which is really illegitimate. Likewise a large factor in the error of the p rosperity teac h ers is th at men com pare and th en fall in to envy and greed.) T ech n ic a lly , A n selm b e lie v es th a t his h ig h est P la to n ic u n iv e rsals lo o se th e ir individuality in God, but even leaving aside the existence of universals, why this should be is not clear. This 'fool' cannot see that God must be the most perfect o f all.
The sam e thing is true of D escartes' form ulation. It is nonsensical to say th at God must have everything. Again the mistake is in the lack of specificality. W hat sense is it to say a being has fluidity and solidity, or perfect roundness and perfect squareness?
This point may also be related to the prosperity arguments. Again they are comparing two states on one basis, forgetting that in some cases comparison is not even possible. Their assumption is that it is always better to be healthy or prosperous, whereas in fact for som e individuals entirely the opposite may be the case, and so it would be very wrong for G od to grant requests for health or wealth to them. They are also guilty of lum ping ev ery th in g in to o n e single category, and fo rg e ttin g th e individual, an interesting thing for a belief which actually is extremely centred on the individual and his prosperity rather that of the community.
CONCLUSION
The assumptions of the ontological argument may therefore be questioned, leading to its failure to achieve what is desired. Prosperity teaching, with similar assumptions, must therefore also be rejected.
It is doubtful w hether anyone has ever been convinced of the existence of G od by the ontological argum ent. Even A nselm fo rm ulated it from a position of faith. The ontological argum ent is really too full of problems, particularly as regards its premise. People come to faith in a less abstract manner. However, it is, I believe, valid to turn the argument around, so that if G od exists, then he must be perfect, or more exactly, is not imperfect in anything. Such a statem ent is almost tautological, but does allow for the idea of change, and also for the retention of the idea of God as guarantor of moral righteousness, although the juxtaposition of these statem ents does cause a new set of problems.
Similarly I believe that the claim of the prosperity teachers can be turned around to give a valid, if reasonably tautological statem ent. In brief their position is that if a Christian has faith, G od will grant what he wants, or to put it another way, G od will make him what he should be. If this is turned around, it becomes a situation such that if a Christian is indeed what he should be, then he will have the faith to claim from God. He will have this because he will be aware of the will of God, and so may pray in full assurance, not just faith, that his prayers will be answered.
It is also worth noting that the ontological argum ent is also valid in a negative sense. T hat is, it is possible to define an object such that its existence becomes impossible, for example a square circle. W hether of course it is valid to say that it may be conceived of is another m atter, but it certainly can be said to exist as a concept, but impossible in reality. It is probably also valid to say that the argum ents of the prosperity teachers are valid negatively. W hereas in a positive sense they want to say that G od will give what we desire, which is invalid, negatively it is true to say that G od will never ultimately harm us, as Paul pointed out in a num ber of places (eg. 1 Cor. 10:13, Rom. 8:31-9). These are, however, very different m atters from a belief in positive blessing.
Anselm's theory lives on, but as little more than an intellectual curiosity in theology. It is unlikely that the acceptance, qualification or rejection of the ontological argum ent has ever really harm ed anyone, a statem ent that is unhappily not applicable to pros perity teaching, of which the unquestioning acceptance has done great harm, even to death (cf W illiam s, 1985:22) . It is to be hoped th a t the ideas o f H agin are soon likewise only of historical im portance, so that they no longer do the damage that they do at present. Just as Anselm's ideas have been found wanting, so those of Hagin fail
